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Garfield County v. WHI, Inc.: Omen of Change 
for Public Land Access Policy* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In Garfield County v. WHI, Inc., 1 the Tenth Circuit 
ruled-much to the delight of interest groups and land man-
agement agencies seeking to preserve traditional access to 
public lands2-that the United States had standing to sue 
in the public's behalf for access by prescription or by a 
grant implied under R.S. 2477. The United State's involve-
ment in Garfield County suggests that land management 
agencies have begun adopting a policy favoring litigation of 
access issues in behalf of the public. This policy promises 
action where inaction has long prevailed and is a welcome 
addition to the access advocate's arsenal. 
But interest groups and land management agencies 
should be wary. Litigation can complicate matters which 
previously were settled quietly. Courts are likely to demand 
more meticulous study and more public input than tradition-
ally has been required. Moreover, as the judicial process is 
seldom predictable, a policy of leaving land access issues to 
the courts could create unnecessary difficulties. For instance, 
while litigation can bring finality to long-standing land ac-
cess disputes, it may also make it harder to change deci-
sions which later prove undesirable. In a land access con-
text, the results of litigation may be too final. 3 For these 
* The author, a third-year student at the J. Reuben Clark Law School, 
gratefully acknowledges the insights and critique of Mr. Dean Gardner and Mr. 
Ken Paur, attorneys in Region 4 of the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. 
Department of Agriculture. However, this note represents the independent 
research and observations of the author, and views expressed do not necessarily 
represent the position of the Department of Agriculture, Mr. Gardner, or Mr. Paur. 
The author would also like to thank Dean Constance Lundberg for 
encouragement and assistance in this endeavor. 
1. 992 F.2d 1061 (lOth Cir. 1993). 
2. In this Note, the term "public lands" generally refers to lands managed 
by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the United States Forest Service (For-
est Service), and similar federal agencies to which the public has traditionally had 
access. For other definitions of "public lands," see Marla E. Mansfield, A Primer of 
Public Land Law, 68 WASH. L. REV. 801, 832 (1993). 
3. The effects of precedent and public policy marble the American justice 
135 
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reasons, interest groups and land management agencies 
would be wise to consider the effect Garfield County will 
have on land access policy and dispute settlement. 
This Note considers the effects and desirability of Gar-
field County in a historical, political context. Part II exam-
ines the laissez faire approach which agencies,4 courts, and 
Congress have traditionally taken to land access problems. 
Part III discusses the manner in which Garfield County 
strengthens the position of access proponents and land man-
agement agencies. Part IV demonstrates how public demand 
system. The influence one decision exerts on future litigation is often apparent only 
after time, and the workings of policy in a particular case are often identified only 
in retrospect. Public land access decisions show that a lack of clearly defined policy 
can "result in inconsistent court rulings" and "conflicts that in some cases could 
have been prevented." U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE FOREST SERVIC:E, TRAVEL MAN-
AGEMENT: BRINGING PEOPLE AND PLACES TOGETHER, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL AC-
CESS AND TRAVEL MANAGEMENT STR>\TEGY TEAM 14, 19 (Jan. 1992) [hereinafter 
TRAVEL MANAGEMENT]. 
4. The Forest Service and BLM often approach public land management 
differently and report to different departments (the Forest Service reports to the 
Secretary of Agriculture, while BLM reports to the Secretary of the Interior). How-
ever, some similarities in how these agencies approach access issues can be par-
tially explained by their "multiple-use" agendas. See WILLIAM E. SHANDS, FEDERAL 
RESOURCE LANDS AND THEIR NEIGHBORS 28 (1979). "Multiple use," as defined in 
the Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-5:n (1988), means 
"management of all the various renewable surface resources of the national forests 
so that they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the needs of the 
American people." Section 528 of that Act specifically mentions "outdoor recreation" 
in an alphabetical list of permissible uses. Another federal statute defines multiple 
use, as it relates to both Forest Service and BLM lands, similarly. Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988). For these 
reasons, this Note treats the policies of these agencies as being comparable except 
where clearly distinguishable. 
Because BLM, the Forest Service, and other land management agencies use 
independent programs to manage different public lands, some authors address chal-
lenges facing one agency without acknowledging that other agencies have similar 
access problems. See, e.g., Merry J. Chavez, Public Access to Landlocked Public 
Lands, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (1987) (generalizing land management agencies un-
der a "BLM" label without mentioning that the Forest Service faceR the same prob-
lems). 
The danger remains that my Note presumes too much similarity. The faultiness 
of such a presumption is illustrated by the fact that BLM has proposed more re-
strictions on claiming R.S. 2477 roads than has the Forest Service. Moreover, the 
Forest Service has often been more receptive to public input than BLM in manage-
ment decisions. Indeed, these agencies have often clashed directly. "AcceRs to the 
federal land is a significant and persistent source of friction between the Forest 
Service and [BLM] and their neighbors. Present policy, programs, and funding 
appear inadequate to resolve these problems in a timely fashion." SHANDS, supra, 
at 48. However, though differences exist, the scope of this paper must be limited 
to access problems facing both agencies similarly. 
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for land access encourages agencies and local governments 
to provide better access. Part V further explores the reasons 
agencies and interest groups benefit from Garfield Coun-
ty-as well as from other related, proposed actions affecting 
land access policy and dispute settlement-and also consid-
ers the limitations of the Garfield County litigation solution. 
II. LITIGATION AND LEGISLATION INDICATE TRENDS IN Ac-
CESS POLICY 
A. Informal Agency Policy of Inaction 
From the time they were first created, agencies such as 
the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest 
Service have faced the problem of access to and rights of 
way on federal lands. Although an effort has been made to 
maintain title to traditional rights of way for administrative 
purposes, public access, absent a significant management 
need, has not been considered "a suitable justification" to 
condemn or to litigate access.5 
Land planners recognized as early as the 1960s that 
increased use of federal lands would intensify access needs. 6 
Accordingly, "several steps [were] taken toward solving this 
long-standing problem.''7 There has not been, however, a 
consistent policy of clarifying when and under what circum-
stances public access exists.8 Until recently, land manage-
ment agencies have appeared reluctant to pursue litigation 
in an effort to quiet title to access routes. 9 This has been 
5. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, WYOMING PlTBLIC LAND ACCESS 16 (1989) 
[hereinafter WYOMING PlTBLIC LAND ACCESS]; see generally Elk Mountain Safari, 
Inc. v. United States, 645 F. Supp. 151 (D. Wyo. 1986) (easements given to the 
Government for administrative purposes do not necessarily provide public access). 
6. In the Federal Roads and Trails Act of 1964, Congress acknowledged that 
"construetion and maintenance of an adequate system of roads and trails within 
and near the national forests and other lands administered by the Forest Service 
is essential if increasing demands for timber, recreation, and other uses of such 
lands are to be met." 16 U.S.C.A. § 532 (West 1986). 
7. Interior Announces Public Land Access Program, 12 OUR PuBLIC LANDS, 
Apr. 1963, at 22 [hereinafter Access Program]. 
8. TRAVEL MANAGEMENT, supra note 3, at 1, 3. 
9. One pragmatic reason not to sue for access is that it often engenders 
negative public opinion of the litigating agency. Employees of "grass-roots" land 
management agencies live among and associate with local landowners and are 
understandably concerned with avoiding the scorn and resentment that results 
when neighbors feel the management agency has infringed on their property rights. 
However, it is likewise true that neighborly relationships are strained, when 
recreationists perceive that employees of management agencies in their communi-
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due, in part, to then Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Leo 
Sheep Co. v. United States, which required the government 
to obtain access to federal lands by "negotiation, reciprocity 
agreements, and the power of eminent domain" rather than 
by implication or prescription.10 Another plausible explana-
tion for this reluctance to pursue litigated outcomes was 
that some doubted whether the United States had standing 
to sue in the public's behalf for prescriptive access. 11 This 
Note takes the position that, on the whole, the standing is-
sue has been an excuse to avoid litigation and an attempt 
to preserve resources by leaving access issues undeter-
mined. 12 Considering the increased management problems 
created by public use, 13 it is conceivable that agencies 
have, in some situations, intentionally allowed access rights 
to remain uncertain in order to discourage land use and to 
minimize policing burdens. The Forest Service, for example, 
has referred to limited access as an effective means of pres-
ervation. 14 This management strategy is still visible in Re-
ties are doing nothing to protect their rights to use public lands. A fair and consis-
tent access policy is therefore in the interest of land management employees. Two 
recent sources have suggested that such local concerns do, and should, affect envi-
ronmental policy. See Sarah F. Bates, Public Lands Communities: In Search of a 
Community of Values, 14 PUB. LAND L. REV. 81 (Spring 1993); Scott McCallum, 
Local Action in a New World Order, 23 ENVTL. L. 621 (1993). 
10. 440 U.S. 668, 681-82 (1979). It is at least plausible that after this deci-
sion land management agencies would have been hesitant to claim access by pre-
scriptive as well as implied easement, since either method would seemingly take 
land without compensating the private landowner. 
11. Doubt as to standing can be seen in Garfield County as well as in earlier 
decisions. For example, i.n Garfield County, co-defendant Payne Land and Cattle 
Company arj:,rued that "the United States has no standing to assert its cross-claim." 
992 F.2d at 1063. Furthermore, Payne Land and Cattle asserted that the district 
court had no jurisdiction over the United States' claim that the road in question 
was a public highway. ld. Although the jurisdictional defense failed in Garfield 
County, lack of jurisdiction was argued successfully in another case. See Standage 
Ventures, Inc. v. Arizona, 499 F.2d 248, 249 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding that a claim 
of title under 43 U.S.C. § 932 (1988), commonly referred to as R.S. § 2477-an act 
declaring roads across public domain lands to be public highways-"is not alone 
enough" to create a federal question). For a discussion of R.S. 2477, see infra part 
Il.C and note 28. This finding has indirectly helped create a question of govern-
ment standing to sue in § 932 cases. To understand the standing question as it 
relates to environmental litigation in general, see Roger Beers, Standing and Relat· 
eel Procedural Hurdles in Environmental Litigation, C855 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1 (June 21, 
1993). 
12. For a discussion of the reasons for and effects of ambiguous access, see 
generally TRAVEL MANAGEMENT, supra note 3. 
13. See discussion and accompanying notes infra part V.A. 
14. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE FOREST SERVICE, NATIONAL FOREST ROADS 
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search Natural Areas, where the Forest Service "lets trails 
fall into disuse and signs topple" as a means of "returning 
the spots to nature."15 
It is now becoming apparent that an ambiguous and 
inactive approach is only exacerbating the access problem. 16 
According to a 1992 assessment by the General Accounting 
Office, "legal public access to somewhat more than fifty mil-
lion acres of [BLM and Forest Service] lands (or 14% of the 
total managed by these agencies) was considered inade·· 
quate." 17 Access proponents, however, estimate that "40% to 
60% of all public land in the West has serious access prob-
lems and one-third has no legal overland access at all." 18 
B. The Courts: Letting the Problem Solve Itself 
The Executive Branch and its agencies are not the only 
entities that have endorsed a laissez faire attitude toward 
access to public lands. Then Justice Rehnquist pointed out 
in Leo Sheep Co. v. United States that in 1962, "Congress 
obviously believed that when development came, it would 
occur in a parallel fashion on adjoining public and private 
lands and that the process of subdivision, organization of a 
polity, and the ordinary pressures of commercial and social 
intercourse would work itself into a pattern of access 
roads."19 His statement that the rarity of "litigation over 
access questions" in the years preceding Leo Sheep is a 
"testament to common sense" suggests that the Court con-
siders the problem one which should sensibly settle it-
sel£.20 Rather than pointing to policies and other 
FOR ALL USES 15 (1986); U.S. DEP"r 01'' AGRICULTURE FOREST SERVWE, ROADS IN 
THE NATIONAL F()RESTS 15 (1988). 
15. Carrie Casey, RNAs: Lands Left Alone, AM. FORESTS, Nov./Dec. 1992, at 
44, 45. 
16. See generally TRAVEL MANAGEMEN1', supra note 8. 
17. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL LANDS: REASONS FOk AND .EF'-
FECTS OF INADEQUATE PuBLIC ACCESS (Apr. 1992), cited in GEORGE CAMERON 
COGGINS ~::r AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 159 (1993); TRAVEL 
MANAGEMENT, supra note 3, at 24 (20 million acres of National Forest do not have 
access). 
18. Ken Slocum, Battle in the West: Public Lacks Access To Much Public 
Land As Ranchers Bar Way, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 1980, at A1; see also Chavez, 
supra note 4, at 1873 (inadequacy of access to BLM lands); Roger Tippy, Roads 
and Recreation, 55 KY. L.J. 799, 804-05 (1967) (considering problems between 
preservationists and recreationists). 
19. 440 u.s. 668, 686 (1979). 
20. ld. at 686-87. 
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problem sources, Rehnquist blames the "litigious" times for 
making access a judicial issue.21 However, the problem is 
not as easily settled by "common sense" as Rehnquist be-
lieved. The judicial policy of leaving access questions to be 
settled in the private sector seems to have worked surpris-
ingly well for a time, but the startling explosion of access 
litigation in the last fifteen years proclaims that traditional 
policies fail to meet modern access needs.22 
C. Attempts to Legislate Access 
Although Justice Rehnquist claims that "the 37th Con-
gress did not anticipate our plight,"23 there have been leg-
islative attempts to provide access. In the Unlawful Enclo-
sures Act of 1885 (UEA), Congress prohibited anyone from 
preventing "by force, threats, intimidation, or by any fencing 
or inclosing, or any other unlawful means . . . free passage 
or transit over or through the public lands.":.l4 Although 
Rehnquist found that the UEA was not "of any significance" 
in Leo Sheep,25 subsequent cases have held that the UEA 
forbids landowners from denying access to public land.:.l6 
Nevertheless, because the Court has not issued a clear rul-
ing on the application of the Unlawful Enclosures Act, it 
21. !d. at 687. 
22. "It may seem surprising that for a long time litigation over access ques-
tions involving federal lands was rare, but no longer-it seems that there has been 
more such litigation in the past fifteen years than in the prior two hundred. Many 
of the issues raised ... result from the collision of ancient and modern law and 
policy." CoGGINS ET AL., supra note 17, at 145-46. 
23. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 687 (1979). 
24. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1061 (West 1986). 
25. 440 U.S. at 683. Ironically, just after finding the Unlawful Enclosures Act 
of no significance in Leo Sheep, Justice Rehnquist blames Congress for not antici-
pating the problem of access to federal lands being blocked by private landowners. 
26. Stoddard v. United States, 214 F. 566 (8th Cir. 1914) (fencing not lawful 
when it denies access to public lands "for lawful purposes"); United States ex ret. 
Bergen v. Lawrence, 848 F.2d 1502 (loth Cir. 1988) (fence on private land which 
prevented antelope from accessing public land illegal). Although Leo Sheep appears 
to definitively hold that UEA does not provide general access to the public lands, 
previous cases suggest that UEA prohibits obstruction of access to public lands for 
legal purposes. See, e.g., Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897). One 
knowledgeable source asserts "Leo Sheep may not be definitive .... There is a lot 
of open space between Leo Sheep and Camfield." Interview with Constance 
Lundberg, Professor at Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School, in 
Provo, Utah (Sept. 8, 1993). See also Ann M. Rochelle, Problems in Acquiring 
Access to Public Lands Across Intervening Private Lands, 15 LAND &. WATER L. 
REV. 119, 133-34 (1980). 
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has not yet become a significant tool to open access to pub-
lic lands. 
The need for legislatively defined access arose soon after 
public domain lands began passing into private ownership or 
being reserved for public purposes. 27 Congress responded 
with a single sentence in the Mining Law of 1866, some-
times referred to as R.S. 2477, providing that a "right of 
way for the construction of highways over public lands, not 
reserved for public uses, is hereby granted."28 Although 
R.S. 24 77 was repealed by the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976,29 state and county governments 
can continue to claim rights of way where title had vested 
before the statute was repealed. 30 
In the second half of the twentieth century, Congress has 
taken a more active position on access issues, passing, for 
example, the Federal Roads and Trails Act of 196431 and 
the National Trails System Act of 1968.32 In the latter Act, 
Congress expressed intent "to provide for the ever-increasing 
outdoor recreation needs of an expanding population" by 
providing for "public access to" and "travel within" the 
"outdoor areas and historic resources of the Nation."33 
Some contest, however, that by attempting both to protect 
private property interests and to provide public access, the 
Courts and Congress together have created an impossible 
situation in which, "it is illegal for anybody but the govern-
ment to ban people from federal land and it is legal to stop 
people from crossing private land to reach public land, even 
27. For a brief summary of some early access problems, see Leo Sheep Co. v. 
United States, 440 U.S. 668, 668-77 (1979) (resulting problems from checkerboard 
and other early land grant schemes). 
28. 43 U.S.C. § 932 (1988) (repealed by FLPMA in 1976) (the Historical Notes 
of which include a savings provision indicating that "[r]epeal ... [is] not to be 
construed as terminating any valid lease, permit, patent, etc., existing on Oct. 21, 
1976."). 
29. Ch. 7, Pub. L. 94-579, § 706(a), 90 Stat. 2743, 2793 (1976) (codified as 
amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1701-84 (1988)). 
30. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1070, 1083 (lOth Cir. 1988) (holding 
that in order for title to vest in the public, road must have been created before 
the land passed into private ownership or was withdrawn from entry under land 
laws). 
31. 16 U.S.C.A. § 532 (West 1986). 
:12. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1249 (1988). 
3:cl. ld. § 1241. 
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if there is no other access."34 Public reaction to this situa-
tion lead to the case of Garfield County. 
Ill. GARFIELD COUNTY AS A REFLECTION OF POLICY 
CHANGE 
A. Garfield County: The Epitome of the Access Problem 
In Garfield County, a road considered public by the local 
populace was blocked by a private landowner in 1960.35 
The public continued to use the road to reach the National 
Forest "for hiking, to collect mistletoe, hunt grouse, and 
fish."36 Since the road crossed private property, BLM land 
and Forest Service land,37 Garfield County can conveniently 
be applied to either agency. It also illustrates that access 
determinations frequently affect both access to federal lands 
and access on federal lands. Although this Note mostly ad-
dresses the problem of access to federal lands, an under-
standing that access on federal lands may also be affected 
helps one understand why increased access can be consid-
ered a "two-edged sword."38 
B. Determination of Standing: Incidental But Helpful 
It is interesting that the standing ruling was only an 
incidental determination in Garfield County. Had the United 
States not been named as a defendant in the suit,39 the 
question of government standing in prescription and related 
cases may have remained unanswered. 
Although the United States was originally named as a 
defendant to the County's complaint,40 "because its ultimate 
interest paralleled that of the County, the United States 
removed this case to federal district court where it was 
realigned as a party-plaintiff."41 Mter the district court de-
34. Slocum, supra note 18, at Al. "The difficulty, [Salt Lake County planners] 
say, is ensuring public acc-ess without infringing on the rights of private-property 
owners or making development too expensive or difficult." Tom Wharton & Craig 
Hansell, Canyon Access Along Wasatch Front Becoming an Uphill Battle, SALT 
LAKE TRIB., June 6, 1993, at Al. 
35. 992 F.2d at 1065. 
36. !d. 
37. !d. at 1062-63. 
38. See infra text accompanying note 73. 
39. 992 F.2d at 1062. 
40. !d. at 1062. 
41. !d. at 1063. 
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livered an adverse decision, both the county and the federal 
government appealed. Significantly, the County withdrew its 
appeal, but the United States chose to contest the 
defendants' allegations that the federal government lacked 
standing.42 The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court 
and, in spite of remanding the case on other grounds, ruled 
that the United States had standing and was a proper 
plaintiff.43 
The original complaint alleged that the United States had 
an interest in the case for two reasons: (1) the road in 
question crossed federal land, and (2) the road provided es-
sential access to public lands.44 Taking these points into 
consideration, the Tenth Circuit ruled that based on the 
road's closure the government satisfied the case-in-controver-
sy requirement-a constitutional requirement which dictates 
that plaintiffs and appellants show "some actual or threat-
ened injury" in order to obtain standing in federal courts.45 
This ruling indicates that injury to the public, caused by 
closure of a road that "provides the citizens of the United 
States and others with an essential, necessary, and unique 
access to lands owned by [the] United States,"46 is suffi-
cient to create government standing. 
It is important to remember in this context, however, 
that the government's argument asserted public rather than 
administrative concerns as the basis for adverse possession. 
This suggests that the government has overcome its reluc-
tance to sue for primarily "public use."47 The Tenth Circuit 
found injury to "public users" and "citizens" satisfactory for 
the purposes of meeting the statutory adverse use require-
ment as well as for creating government standing.48 Refer-
ring to Marshall v. Intermountain Elec. Co.,49 the Tenth 
Circuit further characterized Garfield County as "an action 
brought by the federal government to vindicate public rights 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 1064. 
44. ld. at 1062. By specifically mentioning both that the road crosses federal 
land and that it accesses federal land, the court of appeals suggests that the need 
for access alone would satisfy the injury in fact determination. 
45. ld. at 1064 (referring to U.S. CaNST. art. III, § 2 and citing Franchise 
Tax Board v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 493 U.S. 331 (1990)). 
46. Id. 
47. See WYOMING PuBLIC LAND ACCESS, supra note 5, at 16. 
48. Garfield County, 992 F.2d at 1064. 
49. 614 F.2d 260, 262 (lOth Cir. 1980). 
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or public interests" to which "a state's statute of limitations 
does not apply."50 Thus Garfield County removes both 
standing and statute of limitations concerns as barriers to 
litigating rights of way in behalf of the public for recre-
ational purposes. 
IV. IN THE WAKE OF GARFIELD COUNTY 
A. Loss of Traditional Access and Increased Use 
While timber harvest, grazing, and other traditional uses 
have been curtailed on many public lands, recreational uses 
have increased.51 Despite efforts to improve access,52 some 
areas of traditional access have been lost, due to 
abandonment53 or closure by development.54 Time has ob-
scured the construction and use of many R.S. 24 77 roads, 
making it difficult to maintain them as public rights of 
way.55 This problem is likely to intensify as more time 
passes. It is not likely, however, that recreational demands 
on the public lands will decrease. 56 
B. Interested Groups Seek Fulfillment of Access Needs 
When national policy favored consumption and privatiza-
tion of resources, concerned citizens realized that many 
50. ld. The court points out that the interest to be vindicated can be either 
a fee simple title or an easement. ld. 
51. See, e.g., Recreationists Strike It Rich, OUR PuB. LANDS, Fall 1964, at 7 
(BLM celebrates improved access for recreation in California). 
52. See supra text accompanying notes 7, 23, 28. 
53. David Proctor, Forest Service "Proud" Owners of Atlanta Road, IDAHO 
STATESMAN, Oct. 23, 1993, at lC. 
54. Wharton & Hansell, supra note 84, at Al; Craig Hansell, Luxury Home 
Development Choking Access to Salt Lake County Canyons, SALT LAKE TRIB., June 
6, 1993, at A6. Western states have seen increasing interference with public ac-
cess as landowners adjacent to the forest attempt to preserve use of public lands 
to their own enjoyment at the exclusion of the public. 
55. Several cases have struggled with R.S. 2477 road claims where a long 
time has passed since the qualifying use or construction. See, e.g., Shultz v. De-
partment of Army, 10 F.3d 649 (9th Cir. 1993); Adams v. United States, 687 F. 
Supp. 1479 (D. Nev. 1988), affd in part, vacated in part, a F.ad 1254 (9th Cir. 
1998) (road not a public highway under R.S. 2477 since it was moved from historic 
position); Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068 (lOth Cir. 1988) (question of fact 
arose whether there was an easement and what was its scope); United States v. 
Gates of the Mountains Lakeshore Homes, Inc., 732 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 
1984) (scope of easement unclear after passing of 83 years). 
56. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; Chavez, supra note 4, at 1394-
95. 
139] GARFIELD COUNTY 145 
united voices could influence government more than individ-
ual voices. Those favoring preservation formed groups like 
the Sierra Club and Trout Unlimited.57 These groups have 
swayed agencies toward policies of environmental protection 
and limited use. In order to offset these "group dynamics," 
recreationists spoke out through the National Rifle Associa-
tion (NRA), the National Wildlife Federation, and other 
similar organizations.58 However, the same problems which 
warranted expansion of access litigation have fostered a 
startling number of new local groups specifically seeking 
better access to the public lands. 
Local citizen groups like the Wasatch Front Access Team 
(WFAT),59 Save Our Access Rights (SOAR),60 and the Pub-
lic Land Access Association, Inc. (PLAAI)61 have been orga-
nized to resolve specific access problems in Utah, Idaho, and 
Montana, respectively. Outdoor recreationists, "angry about 
being locked out of public lands," are joining with neighbors 
to protect "public access to the lands and canyons in their 
backyard."62 In response to local pressures, "Forest Service 
officials have admonished property owners for denying the 
public access to the forest."63 However, since Garfield 
County, concerned citizens can motivate federal agencies and 
local counties to do more than merely "admonish." 
C. Public Trust Implications 
Some have suggested that the federal government has a 
public trust obligation analogous to state governments' obli-
gation of preserving access to waterfronts. 64 Case authority 
57. SHANDS, supra note 4, at 53-55. 
58. !d. 
59. Hansell, supra note 54, at A7. 
60. For more information, contact Mr. Craig Shuler, Soda Springs, Idaho (tele-
phone: 208-54 7-304 7). 
61. Public Land Access Association, Inc., P.O. Box 3902, Bozeman, MT 59772-
3902. If one pronounces the acronym PLAAI like "play," it becomes an appropriate 
and witty name for a group of recreational access proponents. 
62. Jon Ure, There's Anger Brewing m Them Thar Hills, SALT LAKE TRIB., 
June 6, 1993, at A7. 
63. Hansell, supra note 54, at A7. 
64. Wharton & Hansell, supra note 34, at A7; see also Ralph W. Johnson et 
a!., The Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal Zone Management in Washington State, 
67 WASH. L. REV. 521 (1992). But cf Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of 
Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doc-
trine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631 (1986). 
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suggests a natural law right to enter public lands. 65 While 
the public trust doctrine has been considered a principle of 
state law, not federal law,66 it is becoming apparent that 
the doctrine can be used to compel an action by both state 
and federal governments.67 An agency's duty to provide ac-
cess was difficult to assert as long as government standing 
to litigate claims of prescriptive and R.S. 2477 roads was in 
doubt. When Garfield County cleared up the question of 
standing, it raised the question of whether land manage-
ment agencies have a public trust duty to protect vested 
prescriptive and R.S. 24 77 rights of way by means of litiga-
tion. 
D. Improved Statutory Compliance 
It is beyond the scope of this Note to say whether the 
public trust doctrine alone would require the United States 
to sue for access. However, the budgetary constraints on use 
of eminent domain,68 coupled with legislation like the 1974 
Resources Planning Act (RPA), which requires the Forest 
Service to provide for recreational and access needs in long-
term land plans,69 may force the government to seek less 
costly means of preserving access. It is becoming apparent 
that public interest in recreational uses of federal lands will 
pressure agencies to plan for access needs. 70 Access to pub-
lic lands is no longer an issue that can be left to itself. In 
order for federal agencies to fulfill their stewardship in 
protecting and providing access to the public lands, they 
65. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908) (citing United States v. 
Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884)). 
66. Johnson, supra note 64, at 521; Chavez, supra. note 4, at 1885 ("the pub-
lic trust doctrine has been used to articulate public rights in other government-
regulated natural resources .... [T)he applicability of this doctrine to access ease-
ments onto public lands is, however, unclear"). For a general history of the public 
trust doctrine, see Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some 
of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425 (1989). 
67. Charles Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, in 
HARRISON C. DUNNING, ED., THE PuBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN NATURAL RESOURCES 
LAW AND MANAGEMENT: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 169, 177 (1981); Joseph L. Sax, 
The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). 
An economic argument for the public trust doctrine is given by Lloyd R. Cohen in 
The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 289 
(1992). 
68. Chavez, supra note 4, at 1386. 
69. Jay Heinrichs, The Future of Fun, AM. FORESTS, Mar./Apr. 1991, at 21. 
70. Id. at 24. 
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must step in and referee, or at least have a say in, the 
disputes among public land users. To meet the recreational 
and traditional demands for access, federal agencies may 
find it expedient to use their new-found standing to pre-
serve traditional rights of way through litigation. 
V. A TwO-EDGED SWORD OR A CAT-0'-NINE-TAILS? 
A. Escalated Abuse and Management Requirements 
Unfortunately, opening land to public use has also come 
to mean opening it to abuse. In recent years, vandalism on 
public lands has become a costly problem.71 Adjacent land-
owners are often unwilling to allow access "out of a concern 
about vandalism and potential liability."72 Since increased 
access may both benefit and challenge public land admin-
istrators, public standing to sue for access has been consid-
ered a two-edged sword.73 However, its potential for creat-
ing a myriad of land management problems and increasing 
public access litigation may prove it to be more like a cat-
o'-nine-tails, a medieval multiple-strand flail used in battle 
to inflict widespread and random injury. As zealous access 
proponents sue for, and are granted, more access than is 
necessary or manageable, management agencies lose control 
and the public lands become subject to countless abuses. 
Considering its duties to oversee and to protect public 
lands, the government is the logical plaintiff in an action 
for public access. This arrangement provides several bene-
fits. ( 1) Costs of settling access conflicts are more equitably 
apportioned to the public, the ultimate beneficiaries. (2) Liti-
gation presumptions favorable to the government are already 
built into existing legislation: e.g., "[a]ny doubt as to the 
scope of the grant under R.S. 2477 must be resolved in 
favor of the government."74 (3) State statutes of limitations 
would not prevent suit for access.75 (4) Federal land man-
71. Glenn D. Harris, "Destructive Recreation" On Our Public Forests, AM. FOR-
ESTS, Sept./Oct. 1991, at 37. 
72. COGGINS ET AL., supra note 17, at 159 (quoting GAO Report). Taking a 
self-help approach, some private landowners "have blocked the historic routes" into 
public lands. Hansell, supra note 54, at A7. 
73. Slocum, supra note 18, at 6. 
74. United States v. Gates of the Mountains Lakeshore Homes, 732 l''.2d 
1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1984). 
75. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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agement agencies would be able to increase access while 
maintaining control. Recreationists would be able to use 
public lands, yet land management agencies would be able 
to avoid many of the problems that would occur if access 
WP.re given too liberally. 
B. Public Involvement and Community Awareness Indis-
pensable 
To make the government the proper plaintiff, however, is 
not to suggest that public interest groups would no longer 
have a say in the access issue. Acknowledging the role pub-
lic interest groups play in monitoring and identifying trends 
in national -sentiment, the Forest Service has requested 
increased public input in its revision of access policies.76 If 
the public is the intended beneficiary of federal lands, then 
federal and county land managers need to know what the 
public wants. Cal Schneller, senior planner for Salt Lake 
County, points out that planners need to know where people 
want trails and access. 77 'What has happened in the past 
is that we get development proposals and nobody knows 
there is a trail head there or if one is needed. Decisions are 
then made accordingly without that information."78 The 
public needs to know its options and make informed rec-
ommendations. 
Interest groups focus government attention on areas need-
ing access and provide impetus in the search for a solution. 
Now that Garfield County has established government 
standing to litigate access, interest groups must see to it 
that the government will do what it can do, namely, resolve 
access conflicts in court, if not by other means. Federal 
standing can be a two-edged sword or a cat-o'-nine-tails, but 
if it fulfills its promise to combat the inertia besieging the 
issue of access to public lands, it will be a formidable weap-
on in the arsenals of both interest groups and the govern-
ment. 
76. TRAVEL MANAGEMENT, supra note 3, at 16. 
77. Wharton & Hansell, supra note 34, at A6. 
78. ld. 
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C. A Glance at Related Problems and Possible Solutions 
Under a broad reading, Leo Sheep stands for the propo-
sition that the government should acquire access by eminent 
domain, rather than by implication or prescription.79 Until 
recently, "[w]hen the Secretary of the Interior has discussed 
access rights, his discussion has been colored by the as-
sumption that those rights had to be purchased."80 Exclu-
sive recourse to this method of acquiring access would be 
ideal and avoid takings issues.81 But the costs of this 
method, when used exclusively, are prohibitive to federal 
land management agencies operating on already tight bud-
gets.82 
In his article on mverse condemnation, Michael M. 
Berger of Berger & Norton, a law firm in Santa Monica, 
California, addresses the general belief that, "if it's for the 
public's good, the public should pay for it."83 He recognizes 
that "the ever-widening gap between governmental goals and 
the economic means to achieve them has resulted in govern-
ment seeking ever more innovative (read "cost free") ways to 
do so."84 In many instances, agencies can provide access to 
public lands without creating new rights of way for which 
the public should pay. For example, they can preserve or 
restore access where there is an existing right of way. 
While compensation is generally required when the gov-
ernment appropriates private lands to public uses, it is 
hardly equitable to require compensation when claiming 
rights of way along roads for which title has already vested 
in the public under prescription statutes or under R.S. 2477. 
Garfield County will have the most potential sway in this 
latter circumstance. Since BLM is in the process of design-
79. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
80. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 687 (1979). 
81. For a leading case on environmental takings, see Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
82. Chavez, supra note 4, at 1375, 1383, 1386 (noting that condemnation 
unavailable due to "fiscal constraints" and that agencies do not have funds to solve 
access problem by paying for access easements). 
83. Michael M. Berger, The Latest About Inverse Condemnation, C791 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 99 (1993). 
84. ld. 
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ing new policy on R.S. 2477 rights of way,85 this is one 
area where timely public input is particularly important. 
1. R.S. 2477 Sunset Provision Darkens Access Outlook 
Already, the trend favoring access is being tempered by 
efforts to limit the ways it can be established. Currently, 
BLM is proposing a sunset provision which would require 
counties and public organizations to file on all R.S. 24 77 
rights of way by a given date or lose the ability to claim 
those routes under this statute.86 Although it is unclear 
whether BLM intends this provision to affect rights of way 
across private lands, it apparently intends to definitively 
settle disputes of R.S. 24 77 roads on BLM property. While 
access proponents, frustrated by the low priority local gov-
ernments give to establishing access,87 seek action to clear 
up rights of way, they do not want action which would 
foreclose the option of accepting R.S. 2477 rights of way. 
Ambiguities in the BLM proposal make it hard to tell 
whether it will affect access to public lands, but it will 
certainly affect transportation on public lands.88 While it is 
doubtful that BLM has jurisdiction to affect R.S. 24 77 roads 
across private lands, that agency should consider what coin-
cidental effect the provision will have on these roads.89 
Any action taken without sufficient public involvement 
would violate the Federal Land Policy and Management 
Act's statutory mandate that BLM give "local governments 
and the public adequate notice and opportunity to comment 
upon and participate in the formation of plans and pro-
grams relating to the management of the public lands."90 
85. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON R.S. 2477: THE 
HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT OF R.S. 2477 RIGHTS-OF-WAY CLAIMS ON FEDERAL AND 
OTHER LANDS (June 199~) [hereinafter REPORT TO CONGRESS]. 
86. !d. at 14. 
87. Wharton & Hansell, supra note 34, at Al. 
88. Since restricted travel would facilitate designation of more wilderness 
lands, wilderness proponents are likely to support a sunset provision. 
Recreationists, on the other hand, oppose provisions which make it harder to reach 
areas of recreational and scenic interest. 
89. For a discussion on how the public can be bound by agency regulations, 
see Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, 
and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE 
L.J. 1311 (1992). 
90. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(0 (1988). 
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Because identification of roads created under R.S. 24 77 
takes a long time and candidacy of such roads for public ac-
ceptance is realized only after use is challenged, a sunset 
provision threatens to eliminate public access routes which 
presently get little use, but which nonetheless may be badly 
needed in the future. 91 Obliteration of dormant access 
routes would complicate the access problem and may be 
contested as a taking. In order to preserve for future dis-
putes a claim that a right of way was created under R.S. 
2477, access proponents must be aware of sunset proposals 
and protect themselves by researching and claiming roads 
which qualify for public acceptance under that statute. 
2. New County Ordinances 
Although the federal government, as administrator of 
federal lands, has a duty to provide access, it is not solely 
responsible. In order to solve the access problem, both state 
and local governments need to include access in land plan-
ning and zoning ordinances. This would be consistent with 
congressional intent as Justice Rehnquist perceived it in Leo 
Sheep.92 Don Davis, a Salt Lake County Recreation official, 
believes that "an ordinance requiring developers to set aside 
land for public access 'would make all the difference in the 
world.'"93 
Others in the Salt Lake area feel that, unless land plans 
with "more legal clout to preserve access" are developed, 
"only those who can afford upscale homes in the canyons 
will have access to public lands behind their properties."94 
The Wasatch Front Access Team95 suggests that counties 
provide access by (1) "working out easement agreements 
with landowners,"96 (2) "using the zoning and development 
91. Eliminating future R.S. 2477 claims would be similar in effect to an Ida-
ho statute, now repealed, which stated that R.S. 24 77 claims could be abandoned. 
That statute caused conflict over liability for a road along the Middle Fork of the 
Boise River in Idaho. For the present solution to that issue, see Proctor, supra 
note 53, at Cl. It is unclear, however, what would be required (i.e., a de minimis 
filing or claim requirement or more involved proof of right of way) under BLM's 
proposal to keep the sun from setting on dormant historical routes. 
92. See supra text accompanying note 19. 
93. Wharton & Hansell, supra note 34, at A6. 
94. Id. 
95. See supra part IV.B. 
96. Hansell, supra note 54, at A6. 
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permit process to mandate access,"97 (3) "using land ex-
changes with private-property owners to acquire property 
rights for trail-head developments,"98 and (4) "convincing 
landowners that allowing responsible use of rights of way 
through their property to canyons can help solve the prob-
lem of unwanted use."99 WFAT contends that counties and 
landowners will cooperate more freely as they see that 
"property values are actually improved when a trail or trail 
head is located near a subdivision.'noo But while increased 
county attention to access needs can help solve the problem, 
increasing litigation indicates the problem is not being re-
solved merely by relying on local governments. 
3. Better Management by Increased User Fees and Mapping 
The Garfield County solution-having the government sue 
in the public's behalf-is not and will not become the sole 
means of preserving and clarifying access. To be most effec-
tive, agencies should combine legal action with other reme-
dies, such as user fees and consistent signing practices. 
Many feel that users of public lands should provide for 
expanding recreational needs by paying higher user fees. 101 
Recreational uses have traditionally been subsidized to cost 
visitors little or nothing, but the Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1987 "amended the Land and Water Conser-
vation Fund Act, raising recreation fees for a number of 
agencies, including the National Park Service and Forest 
Service."102 Since people tend to value what they pay for, 
some feel that heightened appreciation and care for recre-
97. ld. 
98. ld. This has also proven a successful option for the Forest Service, which 
recently negotiated a trail to Mount Olympus in Salt Lake County and has 
reached similar agreements in other areas. 
99. Wharton & Hansell, supra note 34, at A6. 
100. ld. 
101. "Where public access is possible and we have costs associated with it, we 
think it's reasonable that visitors bear the expense." Randy Johnson, Pay to Play: 
A Rationale For User Fees, AM. FORESTS, Mar./Apr. 1991, at 52, 72-73 (quoting 
Audubon Society policy and identifying others who favor user fees); see also Tami 
Gibbons, State Officials Consider Toll Booths in Canyon Areas, DAILY UNIVERSE, 
Jan. 13, 1994, at 10 (noting toll collected to fund canyon management and to dis-
courage gang-related abuse). 
102. Johnson, supra note 101, at 72. 
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ation sites would be a positive side effect of higher user 
fees. 103 
By giving limited access to some uses, demand for open 
public access can be controlled. Where no legal access is 
provided, trespass and abuse often increase, and land man-
agers have a harder time doing their job. Many landowners 
have improved public relations by providing access. 104 At 
times, the best way for private landowners and management 
agencies to reduce the impact on private lands and avoid 
litigation is to provide carefully planned and identified 
means of getting to the public lands on a consistent ba-
sis.105 
Both BLM and the Forest Service have recognized the 
need for better mapping and signing of routes to document 
and inform the public of existing access. 106 Unfortunately, 
at least in Wyoming, this need has not been adequately 
met, for "confusion and contradiction" regarding legal access 
abounds. 107 Better posting practices could alleviate many 
disputes, but-as is the case with government quiet title 
actions, eminent domain, and increased user fees-clearer 
posting will not be effective in all circumstances. Without 
the cooperation and input of all interested parties, there 
will not be a lasting resolution of the access conflict. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For many years litigation of public access was rare, and 
a casual approach to the problem by each branch of gov-
ernment was thought sufficient to handle the problem. In-
creased conflicts in recent years, however, have highlighted 
a need for land managers to directly address the access 
issue. Steady increase in recreational use and loss of tradi-
tional rights of way are fueling the conflict. 
In order to preserve traditional access, access proponents 
and government agencies must consider alternative means of 
103. !d. 
104. Acce~<s Program, supra note 7, at 23. 
105. TRAVEL MANAGEMENT, supra note 3, at 13-14. 
106. TRAVEL MANAGEMENT, supra note 3, at 15; Access Program, supra note 7, 
at 23; Jack Bryant, The Public Lands-Where Are They?, OUR PUB. LANDS, Winter 
1965, at 13 (mapping and signing of access roads make land usable, not just "open 
to public use"). 
107. See letter from Bob Williams, Roseville, CA, in Feedback: Questions, Com-
ments and Responses from Our Readers, WYO. WILDLIFE, Feb. 1994, at 5. 
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securing and maintaining access. Garfield County, by estab-
lishing the government's standing prescriptively to quiet title 
by litigation, suggests a judicial remedy to the access 
problem. The lack-of-standing excuse is not likely to delay 
either prescriptive claims or assertions of an R.S. 2477 right 
of way. Increased user fees and improved county planning 
promise to alleviate many access problems. Caution is re-
quired, however, for while greater access to federal lands 
will expand opportunities, it will also magnify the potential 
for abuse. Nevertheless, Garfield County sets a useful prece-
dent for concerned citizens to see that land management 
agencies develop a policy favoring informed use of the judi-
cial power to preserve traditional public access. Awareness 
and cooperation can keep the two-edged sword of public ac-
cess from becoming a cat-o'-nine-tails. 
Laramie D. Merritt 
